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Neuroimaging, particularly that based upon functional magnetic resonance (fMRI), has become a dominant
tool in cognitive neuroscience. This review provides a personal and selective perspective on its past, present,
and future. Two trends currently characterize the field that broadly reflect a pursuit of ‘‘where’’- and
‘‘how’’-type questions. The latter addresses basic mechanisms related to the expression of task-induced
neural activity and is likely to be an increasingly important theme in the future. This trend entails an enhanced
symbiosis among investigators pursuing similar questions in fields such as computational and theoretical
neuroscience as well as through the detailed analysis of microcircuitry.A Beginning in Neuroimaging
In the late 1970s, I commenced training as a psychiatric resident
at a large mental institution in North London’s Friern Barnet
Hospital, uncertain how my future would unfold. This crumbling
Victorian institution, which gave rise to the cockney colloquialism
for a madhouse, ‘‘Colney Hatch’’ was famously, and sympathet-
ically, depicted in Richard Hunter’s book ‘‘Psychiatry for the
Poor’’ (Hunter and MacAlpine, 1973). The very same author,
a maverick psychiatrist, used to conduct a weekly postmortem
brain dissection demonstration on his deceased patients. At
the time, withinmainstreampsychiatry, themere idea of studying
the human brain as a means to unravel the mysterious nature of
psychiatric illness was viewed as arcane and treated with deri-
sion. Psychiatry was then a discipline paralyzed by a pervasive
intellectual agnosia when challenged as to the likely causes of
severe mental disorder.
I foundHunter’s weekly brain dissection demonstrations fasci-
nating and frustrating. Although the patients coming to postmor-
tem had suffered life-long severe mental illness, it was rare for us
to detect any macroscopic pathology. Indeed, I cannot recall
a single instance, despite the proselytizing zeal of our demon-
strator, where a convincing clinicopathological correlation could
be established. As part of the weekly ritual, and no doubt to
reinforce our attendance, we were served tea and chocolate
biscuits, which provided the context for idle conversation among
my fellow psychiatric residents. We often, subversively given the
context, speculated that the only conceivable avenue for prog-
ress was not through brain dissection, however fine grained,
but by dint of some future technological innovation. What we
often imagined was a dissecting device for the living, one that
would enable the physiological function of the brain to be
revealed in its entire splendor. Less than 30 years later, I need
only to remind myself of this time period to fully appreciate the
extraordinary advances that have ensued in the interim, develop-
ments that have delivered the sophisticated technology of
functional brain imaging.
By 1984, I had completed my first stint as a researcher, thanks
to a generous training fellowship from theWellcome Trust. At this
time, there was growing excitement about a technology that496 Neuron 60, November 6, 2008 ª2008 Elsevier Inc.seemed to presage a conversion of our postmortem dissection
table fantasies into reality. A number of centers around the world
were beginning to use positron emission tomography (PET) to
measure regional cerebral metabolism using radiolabeled glu-
cose or regional cerebral blood flow (rCBF) using radiolabeled
oxygen. The scientific outputs from these centers were primarily
resting-state investigations, where the emphasis was on physio-
logical quantificationof bloodflowandmetabolism.Yet, for those
of us who took an interest, we could immediately intuit its future
possibilities. Within the space of a few years, a number of these
centers were extending resting-state applications of PET, capi-
talizing on the potential of perfusion techniques to measure
task-inducedbrain activity. In hindsight, these techniquesappear
crudeandunsophisticated, but at the time theywereof enormous
importance in realizing a dream within neuroscience, namely the
prospect of a physiological window into the human mind.
I am certain that the excitement and expectation generated by
these developments was the principal motivating factor for the
many young scientists who committed to the field and were
happy to be labeled by their colleagues, often mockingly, as
‘‘imagers.’’ The intellectual promise offered by what I perceived
as a revolutionary means to study the brain was certainly suffi-
cient motivation for me to return to research once I completed
my psychiatric training. In 1989, I arrived at the MRC Cyclotron
Unit at the Hammersmith Hospital in London where I and my
close colleagues over the next 20 years, Karl Friston and Chris
Frith, joined a team led by Richard Frackowiak. We committed,
as did a number of other pioneering groups worldwide, most
notably the group of Marcus Raichle in St Louis, to an ambitious
program to use noninvasive imaging to map the functional archi-
tecture of the living human brain. What follows in this review is
a highly selective perspective on how this field has evolved, its
current and future directions. As a consequence, and because
of a remit that includes a word restriction, the review makes no
claim to comprehensiveness.
A Revolution in Studying the Living Human Brain
Tomeasure brain activity associated with discrete states of mind
is the holy grail of cognitive neuroscience. In the late 1980s and
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nascent progress in perfusion imaging, that proved pivotal in
realizing this dream. The first was the development of sophisti-
cated data analysis tools, subsequently becoming a standard
in the field, which provided whole brain imaging analysis in the
form of statistical parametric maps (Fox et al., 1988; Friston
et al., 1991). Second, the early 1990s saw the surprising and
rapid emergence of a new approach to brain mapping using
MRI based upon the blood-oxygen-level-dependent (BOLD)
technique (Ogawa et al., 1990). This latter approach had signifi-
cant benefits over PET, including greater spatial resolution and
the absence of the potential hazards associated with radioactive
tracers. The significance of this development derives from the
fact that neuroscience now had a technology that was noninva-
sive and that afforded multiple repeated measures of brain
activity across various task manipulations. The end result was
fMRI, a technique that afforded much greater experimental
flexibility.
Apart from obvious methodological advantages associated
with fMRI, it had, in my view, an equally important cultural conse-
quence. Access to PET as a technique, entailing by necessity the
use of ionizing radiation, was vested in the hands of an elite. Their
privileged position was predicated on either having nuclear
medicine expertise, a medical license, or both. The fact that
fMRI involved no inherent biohazard meant that it could now
be deployed within less restricted environments, for example,
within psychology departments of universities. In essence,
fMRI democratized access to a powerful technology for investi-
gating the living human brain, allowing a broad cross-section of
academic disciplines to pursue new agendas. This, in my view,
accounts for a virtual exponential rise in published neuroimaging
output that, over the past 15 years, has been largely led by ques-
tions related to human cognition. Most people would agree that
democracy is a good thing; equally, most people would agree
that all things taken in excess should carry a health warning.
A Selective History of Imaging Human Cognition
The first applications of activation-based neuroimaging in the late
1980s involved the use of PET and utilized simple subtraction
techniques based upon presenting alternating blocks of stimuli.
In essence, this approach involved measuring brain activity in
a condition of interest in one block and then subtracting activity
associated with a carefully specified control condition acquired
in a second block. This procedure was predicated on the idea
of pure insertion of sequential cognitive processes and allowed,
in principle, localization of discrete cognitive functions (Friston
et al., 1996). Early examples of this methodology included identi-
fying brain regions that process single words (Petersen et al.,
1988; Posner et al., 1988) and the human homolog of V4 (Lueck
et al., 1989) and V5 (Zeki et al., 1991), areas specialized for visual
color and motion processing, respectively. These so-called
‘‘block designs’’ also characterize early fMRI studies. Where
PET measurements necessarily required long data collection
sequences, such temporal inflexibility was overcome using fMRI.
In the first instance, more flexible thinking on the part of exper-
imental design provided new, more rigorous approaches that
involved the implementation of parametric (Grafton et al., 1992)
and factorial experimental designs (Friston et al., 1992). Theseprovided a higher degree of experimental control and inference.
Such developments coincided with a new class of questions,
such as ‘‘how does the presence or absence of selective atten-
tion influence brain activity associated with processing some
other factor?’’ (O’Craven et al., 1997) In addition, this increasing
sophistication in factorial methodologies provided the platform
for in vivo pharmacological challenges in conjunction with
cognitive activation paradigms, enabling a characterization of
how neuromodulatory influences impact discrete cognitive
processes in health and disease (Dolan et al., 1995).
At the end of the 1990s, experimenters began to harness fMRI
to its full potential. This was initiated by the implementation of
event-related fMRI, a procedure akin to measuring evoked re-
sponses in electrophysiology, and obviated the shortcomings
of the less flexible blocked designs. Researchers were now
able to capitalize on known physiological properties of neurons,
such as their susceptibility to adaptation with repetition of an
input, and, using this knowledge, to enhance both spatial and
functional sensitivity. This latter approach, akin to repetition
suppression, allowed detection of representations that might
be instantiated within topographically overlapping neuronal net-
works. This new approach was applied to both low-level and
high-level stimulus attributes (Tootell et al., 1998: Grill-Spector
and Malach, 2001; Winston, et al., 2004).
The 1990s was a decade that witnessed an explosion in appli-
cations of neuroimaging that generated data on virtually every
conceivable aspect of human cognition, including sensori-motor
learning (Karni et al., 1998), attention (Kastner et al., 1998), short-
(Courtney et al., 1998; Jonides et al., 1993; Owen et al., 1996b)
and long-term memory (Fletcher et al., 1995; Schacter and
Buckner, 1998; Shallice et al., 1994; Wagner et al., 1998), per-
ception (Haxby et al., 1991, 1996), language (Howard et al.,
1992; Petersen et al., 1990; Price et al., 1992, 1997), and execu-
tive functions (Baker et al., 1996; Grasby et al., 1993; Owen et al.,
1996a). While many findings recapitulated what would be pre-
dicted from lesion based models, it also turned out there were
many surprising findings. For example, in the case of episodic
memory, it turned out that performance of relatively simple tasks
engaged regions of the brain that would not have been predicted
from lesion models (Petrides et al., 1995; Tulving et al., 1994a,
1994b). This reflected, in part, the fact that attribution of function,
based upon a lesion-deficit model, rested on an assumption that
the consequences of a lesion solely reflected disruption of func-
tion in the damaged region. However, sophisticated perspec-
tives on the impact of a lesion account for the fact that cognition
arises not just out of functional differentiation but also out of
functional integration. Consequently, the impact of a localized
lesion is likely to reflect both local and distributed effects, evi-
denced bymore widespread activations seen with neuroimaging
than was predicted by a lesion-deficit model.
One far-reaching impact of neuroimaging has been the extent
to which investigators were now empowered to tackle issues
and questions that were not reflected in classical psychological
parsing of the mind, as might be found in standard textbooks of
psychology. In this regard, the impact of neuroimaging has argu-
ably been greatest in relation to topics that were either ignored in
neuropsychology or were heretofore difficult to tackle experi-
mentally. Two pertinent examples involve the growth of studiesNeuron 60, November 6, 2008 ª2008 Elsevier Inc. 497
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emotion, respectively.
In studies of consciousness, neuroimaging provided the
means to address disparate questions inconceivable without
this new technology. These include how the exercise of ‘‘free
will’’ engages discrete circuits (Frith and Dolan, 1996), the fate
of unseen but psychologically effective stimuli (Dehaene et al.,
2001; Dehaene et al., 1998), the correlates of subjective percep-
tion (Lumer et al., 1998; Lumer and Rees, 1999), imagined future
states (Sharot et al., 2007), aswell as the level of residual neuronal
function seen in patients with varying impairments of conscious-
ness (Owen, 2008), to name a few. In the field of emotion, func-
tional neuroimaging allowed a characterization of how the brain
responds to external emotional stimuli (Morris et al., 1996;
Whalen et al., 1998), the expression of emotional learning and ex-
tinction (Buchel et al., 1998; LaBar et al., 1998), and how emotion
impacts on perception (Noesselt et al., 2005; Vuilleumier et al.,
2004) and memory (Kensinger and Schacter, 2006). Even more
importantly, the subjective nature of emotional measures were
overcome with direct investigation, where studies characterized
the neural basis of distinct feeling states (Damasio et al., 2000)
and enabled a description of how interoceptive states, for exam-
ple, changes in peripheral autonomic status, are mapped in the
brain (Critchley et al., 2004). Interestingly, the representation of
interoceptive states in anterior insular cortex was subsequently
shown to also provide a substrate that enables a person to repre-
sent the subjective feeling states of others as, for example,
expressed in empathy for pain (Singer et al., 2004).
Less than 20 years since its inception, the field of neuroimag-
ing, using fMRI, has reached a high level of maturity andmethod-
ological sophistication. Neuroimaging now attracts interest not
only from cognitive neuroscientists but also from a wide array
of fields that lay outside those that might be thought to be
concerned about the brain. Consequently, we have witnessed
the emergence of a strong symbiosis between functional neuor-
oimaging and a range of other disciplines, inmany instances con-
stituting unlikely bedfellows, including genetics (Drabant et al.,
2006; Hariri et al., 2002), economics (Camerer, 2003; deQuervain
et al., 2004; King-Casas et al., 2005), ethics (Hsu et al., 2008), and
aesthetics (Winston et al., 2007), to name a few.
Current Perspectives within Neuroimaging
A repeatedly asked question over the past 20 years is what brain
imaging has brought to neuroscience that was not already
known. First, functional imaging realized what was never previ-
ously possible: namely, a characterization of the functional
anatomy of the intact brain without the confound of pathology
and the likely consequential plastic reorganization in response
to disease or developmental abnormalities. Second, functional
neuroimaging highlighted that even simple tasks engaged more
widespread areas of the brain than would have been assumed
from the lesion-deficit approach. This has led to a richer concep-
tualization of how brain function underpins cognition not only in
terms of functional differentiation (localization) but also in terms
of functional integration (distributed function). This latter charac-
terization has motivated a new class of questions and methodo-
logical approaches that address how distributed brain regions
interact during performance of a psychological task, as charac-498 Neuron 60, November 6, 2008 ª2008 Elsevier Inc.terized in terms of functional connectivity (Fletcher et al., 1996)
(which assess a significant dependence or mutual information
between regional activities in different parts of the brain) and
effective connectivity (the causal influence one regions exerts
over another) (Buchel and Friston, 2001; Friston, 1994; McIntosh
and Gonzalez-Lima, 1994). Furthermore, these developments
have now furnished investigators with the tools to ask questions
related to how brain regions comprising a distributed network in-
teract within that network after some experimental manipulation:
for example, thepresenceor absenceof attentionor theevolution
of some form of learning (Plailly et al., 2008).
Neuroimaging has now consolidated its position as the major
platform for a systems level understanding of the human brain.
Currently within the field, there appears to be two broad concep-
tual trends. On the one hand, there is a ‘‘Kuhnian’’ culture of
normative and largely descriptive imaging neuroscience using
standard andwell-established approaches based upon classical
experimental manipulations and data analysis. This constitutes
the majority of the field and is a testament to its scientific matu-
rity. This contrasts with emerging approaches that are more
embedded in theoretical and computational neuroscience and
largely concerned with a broader and more mechanistic set of
questions that speak to fundamental questions regarding how
the brain works. Here, neuroimaging is seeing a striking conver-
gence with expertise from other fields, such as engineering,
dynamic programming, and computational neuroscience.
One recent development that is more allied with the former
descriptive approach has been the use of multivariate pattern
classification procedures. An example is the use of support
vector machines (SVMs) to establish statistical dependence
between distributed responses in a circumscribed part of the
brain and some experimental variable. These approaches have
excited much media attention and have been in the vanguard
of claims related to mindreading or predicting future intentions.
In simple terms, these procedures involve training a classifier
with brain activity obtained during an experimental manipulation:
for example, being presented with a house or a face. Then, in
a subsequent phase of the experiment, conducted in the same
subjects, the trained classifier can provide a reliable prediction
of the sensory input (was it a house or a face?) (Kamitani and
Tong, 2005). From a scientific perspective, these approaches
have been claimed to be more sensitive than equivalent univar-
iate analyses (Haynes and Rees, 2006). What emerges in most
multivariate classification applications is a probabilistic mapping
between activity in a subset of brain voxels and some aspect of
the sensorium or behavior. Criticisms of these approaches in-
clude a suggestion that they represent a return to neophrenology
and an absence of clarity regarding what new neurobiological
questions are specifically amenable to these classifiers. Since
these classification techniques are extremely sensitive to subject
and paradigm specifics, the precise nature of what these signals
represent is at best difficult to pinpoint. Newer multivariate
approaches go some way to addressing these concerns, for ex-
ample, the use of decoding based upon quantitative receptive-
field models that have allowed people to decode natural images
from an observer’s brain activity (Kay et al., 2008).
One exciting, and less contentious, development that reflects
a convergence with theoretical neuroscience has been the
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putational rather than psychological models. This approach
owes much to the impact of the late David Marr, who argued
that a sine qua non for understanding the human brain, or any
system within the brain, involves specifying a computational
goal (Marr, 1982). Such a perspective has two immediate conse-
quences in terms of empirical research. First, it speaks to defin-
ing the algorithmic nature of the transformations between input
and output and, second, specifying how this is implemented in
the hardware of the brain (Marr, 1982). The application of this ap-
proach has involved harvesting the outputs froma computational
model that provides a formal description of a transformation be-
tween a sensory input and behavioral output. For neuroimaging,
the key variables are those proposed tomediate this transforma-
tion, an example being a prediction error signal underpinning
reward-based or punishment-based learning. These variables
are then correlated against fMRI data to determine brain regions
manifesting a response profile consistent with the model vari-
ables. The key advantage of these model-based approaches
derives from the fact that they address how a particular cognitive
process is implemented in a specific brain area as opposed to
identifying the location of its instantiation. An early example
has been the implementation of temporal difference (TD) learning
models, where the striking finding was that a TD-like prediction
error signal was expressed in the ventral striatum during reward
learning (McClure et al., 2003; O’Doherty et al., 2003). Model-
based approaches also enable specific inferences regarding
underlying neuromodulatory influences. For example, the likely
dopaminergic nature of a reward prediction error signal seen in
reward-based neuroimaging experiments was demonstrated in
an investigation that used a computational learning model,
Q-learning, in conjunction with an in vivo pharmacological
manipulation of dopamine function (Pessiglione et al., 2006).
This general approach has opened up a very rich field of investi-
gation, particularly in the context of human decision making, that
has seen a characterization of neuronal responses associated
with exploratory and exploitative choice behavior (Daw et al.,
2006), reward predictability and uncertainty (Berns et al., 2001;
Critchley et al., 2001), intertemporal choice (McClure et al.,
2004), and subjective utility (Kable and Glimcher, 2007).
In line with these developments, neuroimaging is also witness-
ing a more mechanistic emphasis that unambiguously reflects
a shift within the field from ‘‘where-’’ to ‘‘how-’’ type questions.
This emphasis parallels the development of generative modeling
of brain responses using, for example, Dynamic Causal Model-
ing (DCM) (David et al., 2006; Stephan et al., 2008; Friston
et al., 2003). In DCM, the data (be it fMRI, EEG, orMEG) is viewed
as being caused by a perturbation of hidden neuronal states by
some experimental input. These perturbations produce neuronal
dynamics through neuronal interactions that are passed through
biophysically motivated forward models to form the observed
responses (for example, the BOLD response in fMRI). Inversion
of these models furnishes conditional densities (e.g., conditional
mean and precision) on the parameters of the underlying neuro-
nal and hemodynamic models and their marginal likelihood for
model comparison. The identification or inversion of generative
models, given some data, enables conditional inferences about
the parameters of these models and, critically, comparison ofdifferent generativemodels (Penny et al., 2004). The term ‘‘model
comparison’’ may be erroneously understood as an artificial
delineation of parameter space but, in fact, simply embodies
hypothesis testing where these competing hypotheses can be
framed in terms of competing generative models of the same
data.
This aforementioned approach contrasts with standard tech-
niques that rely solely on establishing statistical dependencies
or probabilistic mappings between behavioral and physiological
data or between physiological data acquired from different parts
of the brain, which provide no machinery for model comparison
beyond the existence of that mapping. Recently, attempts have
been made to marry the different modeling approaches de-
scribed above and create models that jointly represent compu-
tational and physiological mechanisms of neuronal systems.
For example, predictive coding models of perception can be
formulated in terms of hierarchically structured dynamic causal
models (Friston, 2005). Alternatively, computational models of
learning and decision-making can be embedded into dynamic
causal models; this allows one to investigate how computational
processes are reflected by time-dependent changes in specific
connection strengths or neuronal state variables. An example
is a recent study that integrated a Rescorla-Wagner learning
model into a dynamic causal model, demonstrating that predic-
tion errors drive the consolidation of connection strengths during
associative learning (den Ouden et al., 2008).
Functional neuroimaging has been heralded as a technology
that will impact upon our understanding of nervous system
diseases. A sanguine view is that its impact has been, at best,
modest. In neurology, for example, it has shed light on mecha-
nisms in recovery of function following stroke (Ward et al.,
2004, 2006). Classificatory approaches, using support vector
machines (SVMs), show considerable promise in providing a
classification of likely neurodegenerative process, based upon
structural brain appearance, that may surpass the accuracy of
neuroradiological experts (Kloppel et al., 2008). Paradoxically, it
is in the problematic field of psychiatry that a so-called ‘‘transla-
tion’’ potential holds the greatest prospect of realization. There is
a growing theoretical and empirical sophistication within cogni-
tive neuroscience related to understanding emotional learning
and extinction, motivation, and reward. The likelihood that this
sophistication can provide both a more principled classification
of psychiatric disorders and a high level specification of aberrant
cognitive processes should not be underestimated. In the case of
schizophrenia, the ability to characterize neuronal interactions
using approaches such asDCM, including how neuromodulatory
influences alter these interactions (Corlett et al., 2007; Honey
et al., 2008; Murray et al., 2008), means that theoretical models
of this disease, based upon the idea that the disorder reflects
a failure of integration, can now be tested empirically.
Macro- and Microscopic Mapping of the Brain
Current general theories of the brain invoke the idea that a core
function is to infer the causes of sensory input. Almost univer-
sally, such theories call upon hierarchical network models of
how sensory data are generated. The relevance of systems
neuroscience arises out of the fact that hierarchical optimisation
in the brain is distributed, entailing recurrent self-organizedNeuron 60, November 6, 2008 ª2008 Elsevier Inc. 499
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chies. At the systems level, brain imaging using fMRI (as well as
EEG and MEG) provides for a precise delineation of these
functional architectures. As described, one can invert biologi-
cally realistic models with a large number of state variables
and biophysical parameters, using state-of-the-art variational
Bayesian techniques, with the inherent ability to quantify the
uncertainty about any experimentally induced changes (Friston
et al., 2007). Inversion of these models allows one to make infer-
ences about neuronal processes that cannot be observed
directly with available noninvasive techniques, for example, sen-
sitization of glutamatergic postsynaptic responses or changes in
neuronal spike frequency adaptation.
Ongoing validation studies in rodents have demonstrated the
potential of this approach (Moran et al., 2008) and highlight
a more general imperative to connect micro- and macroneuro-
biological scales by marrying and cross-validating techniques
in animal and human neuroimaging. The increasing availability
of intracranial recordings from patients provides a further bridge
to validate noninvasive models and test the resolution of our
predictions. In other words, one can optimize the level of model-
ing and assess, in a quantitative fashion, whether a particular
imaging modality is sufficient to answer questions framed at a
particular level of neurobiological model. However, future prog-
ress here is almost certainly going to benefit from much closer
interactions between imaging neuroscience and scientists
pursuing a microscopic characterization of underlying circuits.
This knowledge is necessary to provide empirical constraints
on microcircuitry and relative connection strengths that can
then be transcribed directly into current models of EEG, MEG,
or fMRI data, in essence informing macroscopic characteriza-
tions of brain function with microscopic observations of brain
structure.
Conclusions and a Personal Coda
The dominant position of functional neuroimaging in systems
neuroscience is unlikely to change in the immediate future. This
reflects not only the absence of any emerging competition to
existing technologies but also the necessity for system level
descriptions of cognitive processing, no matter how one con-
ceives of how the brain works. However, an increasing discourse
between imaging neuroscience and experts from disciplines
such as computational and theoretical neuroscience, as well as
those working at the level of microcircuitry, seems inevitable.
The largely untapped potential of functional neuroimaging to pro-
vide a richer characterization of aberrant processes in psychiatric
disorders is likely to be of increasing importance. The more
far-fetched claims made in relation to neuorimaging, evoking an
Orwellian nightmare, are unlikely to threaten our human attach-
ment to privacy. The reality is that deterministic predictions on
behavior need to contend with the fact that even simple neuronal
systems, and their expression in behavior, embody indetermi-
nacy. Indeed, this indeterminancy is introducedby thebrain itself,
where it is suggested that it provides for a variance that optimizes
long-term survival (Carpenter, 2004).
It is now nearly 20 years since I agreed to a career in imag-
ing neuroscience, a period that coincides with the publication
history of Neuron, and I find myself caught in an ironic twist of500 Neuron 60, November 6, 2008 ª2008 Elsevier Inc.fate. I amsitting in awaiting room reflecting onhaving committed,
at extremely short notice, to writing this opinion piece while
preparing myself for an MRI scan on an increasingly painful right
shoulder. I keep a rumbling anxiety in the background by an old
trick of distraction, in this case realized by aimlessly flicking
through an assortment of well-fingered magazines. Almost inev-
itably, I stumble across a magazine article that is a feature on
brain imaging, entitled ‘‘The brain hacker,’’ with an equally atten-
tion grabbing subtitle, ‘‘they can read your mind.’’ The opening
paragraph is indeed ominous and enough to make any mortal
shudder at the prospect of submitting to any procedure suffixed
withMRI, even ostensibly on a relatively unsophisticated piece of
shoulder anatomy. Who can relax when reading: ‘‘Machines that
read your thoughts have longbeen the stuff of science fiction. But
now brain-scanning techniques are being used to see if you
prefer Coke to Pepsi. Are secrets a thing of the past?’’ Reading
on, I learn that the application of brain imaging is all-embracing
when it comes to the human condition, and it can now unravel
political preferences (neuropolitics), the likely choice of goods
to purchase (neuromarketing), unmask covert racism, and distin-
guish truth from lies and even true love frommere lust. I momen-
tarily remind myself, ‘‘It’s only your shoulder.’’ As I ease into the
engulfing claustrophobia that is the bore of an MRI magnet, I
reassure myself, without undue effort, that my personal secrets
are safe and that the reality of brain imaging is more prosaic
than the ubiquitous hype of newspapers and magazines.
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